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“On corporation tax, the Chancellor got his priorities wrong today.  
The public will simply not understand why, when businesses are  
enjoying record profits, the Chancellor found money to cut their tax payments”.  
 
“The TUC is not in favour of companies paying excessive taxes,  
but we do expect them to pay fair taxes”. 
 
Brendan Barber, General Secretary of the UK Trades Union Congress,  
on the 2007 UK corporation tax cut (FT.com, 2007) 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A central issue in the distribution of tax burdens is the effective incidence of the 
corporation tax. This has been the subject of study for nearly 50 years in theoretical, and 
in Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models.1 Nonetheless, despite its policy 
relevance, until very recently it received virtually no econometric investigation. 
This paper re-examines the extent to which taxes on corporate income are passed 
on to workers in the form of lower wages. We make two main novel contributions. First, 
we model a new mechanism by which corporate taxes may be passed on in lower 
wages: the wage bargain. We differentiate two aspects of the effective incidence of the 
tax. Differently from previous contributions, we identify the direct incidence of the tax: 
given the pre-tax profit of the firm, a higher tax bill will directly reduce the quasi-rent 
over which the workers and the company can bargain. The indirect incidence instead 
has an effect on wages through determining the level of pre-tax profit, by affecting 
either investment or output prices. Second, we test the size of this effect using 
unconsolidated firm-level accounting data for over 55,000 companies in nine major 
European countries over the period 1996 to 2003. Variations in tax payments and 
effective tax rates arise due to both differences across countries and over time in the 
                                                 
1  In a 1994 survey of North American tax professionals undertaken by Slemrod (1995), 75 per cent of 
respondents believed that corporate income taxes are largely passed on to workers and consumers. 
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legal tax system, and due to firm-specific factors. We identify the effects of taxation 
using all of these sources of variation. 
The literature on the incidence of taxes on corporate income dates back to 
Harberger (1962), who developed a model of a closed economy with a corporate sector 
and a non-corporate sector, and analysed the introduction of a tax only in the corporate 
segment of the economy. Harberger (1962) showed that the incidence of the tax 
depended on a number of factors, including the elasticities of substitution between 
labour and capital used in each sector, and between the goods produced in each sector. 
His main conclusion was that under reasonable assumptions, the tax is borne by all 
owners of capital, across both segments of the economy, as it drives down the post-tax 
return to capital. A number of more complex CGE models with a larger number of 
sectors generate similar results (see for example Shoven, 1976). 
However these results depend crucially on among other things, the assumption 
of a closed economy, which restricts the supply of capital to the economy. If capital is 
perfectly mobile between countries, but labour is not, then the results can be very 
different. Bradford (1978) and Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) showed that the 
introduction of a tax on corporate income in a home country tends to reduce the world 
rate of return to capital, and tends to shift capital from the home country to the rest of 
the world. This shift in capital reduces the return to labour in the home country, and 
increases the return to labour abroad. As the home country becomes small relative to the 
rest of the world, the effect on the world rate of return diminishes towards zero. There 
remains an exodus of capital, and the domestic labour force effectively bears the entire 
burden of the tax. Indeed given a deadweight loss induced by the outward shift of 
capital, the cost to the home country labour force can exceed the tax revenue generated. 
This suggests that a small open economy would be better off taxing immobile labour 
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directly, compared to imposing a tax which distorts the allocation of capital (Gordon, 
1986). 
A number of recent contributions have developed more sophisticated general 
equilibrium models of the long-run incidence of taxes on corporate income in an open 
economy (Randolph, 2006; Gravelle and Smetters, 2006; and Harberger, 1995; 2006). 
Randolph (2006) considered a model with two countries and five sectors, with three of 
the sectors being taxed only in the domestic country. Of critical importance in the model 
are the assumptions about factor mobility, supply elasticities, and the relative capital 
intensities of the different sectors. Under reasonable assumptions, Randolph (2006) 
found that the domestic labour force and owners of domestic capital bear the tax burden 
roughly in proportion to their factor income shares: labour bears 73 per cent of the tax 
burden. Where the domestic economy is large (as for the United States), the tax also 
increases wages and reduces the return to capital in the foreign country. Gravelle and 
Smetters (2006) allowed for a form of imperfect competition with the possibility that 
tradable goods are not perfect substitutes across countries. This effectively reduces the 
mobility of capital, and increases the extent to which owners of capital bear the tax 
burden. 
Of course these models exclude several factors that may be important. In a 
recent survey, Auerbach (2006) noted a number of such factors including dynamics, 
investment incentives, corporate financial policy, choice of organisational form and 
alternative forms of imperfect competition. In this paper, we extend the literature by 
drawing on many studies of wage determination to investigate how taxes on corporate 
income can play a role in the wage bargain. Instead of making the simple assumptions 
that the aggregate stock of labour is fixed, and that labour is paid its marginal product, 
we investigate the wage bargain at the firm level. To do so, we introduce a tax on 
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corporate income into the basic efficient bargaining framework of McDonald and Solow 
(1981), in which the firm and the labour force bargain over both wages and 
employment. 
This generates a previously unexplored channel through which corporate taxes 
can affect wages. Companies operating in imperfect competition may bargain over the 
proportion of quasi-rents paid out in wages. We introduce into the bargain a standard 
tax on domestic corporate income, which is levied on profit net of wages and an 
allowance for capital expenditure. We refer to the impact of the tax through the wage 
bargain itself–conditional on value added–as a direct effect, which reduces the size of 
the quasi-rent available to bargain over. Our model specification enables us to identify 
this effect empirically at the level of an individual firm. We present evidence below 
suggesting that this direct effect is both large and significant. 
We distinguish this from indirect effects of the tax, which can arise through two 
channels. First, there may be an effect of a change in the tax liability on the output price, 
conditional on capital and labour. Second, a change in tax may affect the incentive to 
invest and hence the capital stock, and indirectly the labour force. Both of these may 
affect the pre-tax level of value added.2 The second effect determines the size of the 
deadweight cost arising from distortions to the behaviour of the company as a result of 
the tax. 
Our paper builds on an empirical literature investigating the extent to which 
wages are partly determined by sharing in quasi-rents.3 Part of this literature examined 
the extent to which rents generated by technological innovation are passed on in higher 
wages; for example, Van Reenen (1996) followed both a reduced form and a structural 
                                                 
2  In an international context, wage bargaining may give a firm an incentive to generate outside options 
in the form of foreign investment. See, for example, the model by Eckel and Egger (2006). 
3  In a recent contribution, using similar data to this paper, Budd, Konings, and Slaughter (2005) 
investigated whether wages are determined as a share of parent-firm profit as well as subsidiary 
profit. 
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approach to examine this question. Like Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Van Reenen 
(1996) emphasised the importance of dealing with the endogeneity of quasi-rents. 
Dealing with endogeneity appropriately can significantly raise the estimated proportion 
of quasi-rents passed on to the workforce. Our estimates of the elasticity of wage 
payments with respect to value added are higher than those in the literature are. 
However, we find these elasticities plausible, in that they imply that the effect of a 
marginal increase in quasi-rents on wage payments is very similar to the ratio of wage 
payments to quasi-rents. Our model indicates that a marginal increase in the tax liability 
has a larger effect, since unlike the pre-tax quasi-rent it is not subject to tax itself. The 
empirical results support this. 
Four other recent papers aim to provide empirical evidence of the incidence of 
taxes on corporate income.4 Hassett and Mathur (2006) used aggregate wage and tax 
data from 72 countries over the period 1981–2002. They experimented with different 
measures of the tax rate. They found that wages are highly responsive to the corporate 
tax rate, and more so in small countries. One element of this approach is surprising 
however. In most of its empirical formulations, the paper adds controls, including a 
measure of value added per worker in the manufacturing sector. This control is unlikely 
to be independent of the effects of the tax on corporate income, which the authors are 
seeking to identify: a higher tax rate should generate a net outflow of capital, which is 
likely to depress value added per worker. To the extent that their paper identifies a large 
effect of the tax on wages, conditional on value added per worker, then the effect they 
identify would also seem to abstract from effects arising indirectly through changes in 
value added. 
                                                 
4  A survey of this literature is provided in Gentry (2007). 
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Felix (2007) employed aggregate data on wages differentiated by skill level 
from 19 developed countries over the period 1979–2000. Controlling for the openness 
of the economy, and using alternative measures of the tax rate, Felix (2007) also found 
very large and significant effects of the corporate income tax on wages. The effect tends 
to be uniform across skill levels. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) used aggregate data on 
the activities of US companies in around 50 countries in four years to estimate jointly 
the impact of the corporate income tax on the wage rate and the rate of profit. Fixing the 
sum of these effects to be unity, they found results of a similar magnitude to Randolph 
(2006): between 45 and 75 per cent of the corporate tax borne is borne by labour with 
the remainder falling on capital. Again, fixing the sum of the effects to be unity 
abstracts from the indirect effects of the deadweight cost, which if included would 
generate a total effect in excess of unity. 
Riedel (2008) also presented a wage-bargaining model in the presence of a 
simplified corporate tax. Partly based on the empirical results of Budd, Konings, and 
Slaughter (2005), she modelled the bargain as being over the sum of the parent firm’s 
profit and the subsidiary’s profit. Abstracting from capital, this model predicts that a 
higher domestic tax rate would tend to increase domestic wages, because it would 
reduce the cost to the domestic subsidiary of paying wages (since taxable income is net 
of wages), while not reducing the size of the parent company’s profit.5 Symmetrically, a 
rise in the tax rate applied to the parent company would tend to reduce wages in the 
domestic subsidiary, since the total profit to be bargained over would fall, while the cost 
of paying domestic wages would be unchanged. Riedel (2008) found empirical support 
for the latter proposition, but not for the former. 
                                                 
5  Note that this is the exact opposite of the result that would be found if the domestic subsidiary 
bargained over domestic profit only, but there was an outside option. In this case the higher tax rate 
would leave the value of the outside option unaffected, leading to a lower domestic wage rate. This 
effect was showed, for example, by Goerke (1996). 
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Our empirical analysis differs from these papers in several important respects. 
We exploit within-firm and cross-firm variation in taxation using firm-level data. We 
use a panel of unconsolidated firm-level accounting data for around 55,000 companies 
in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom over the period 1996–2003. Controlling for labour productivity (and 
hence for the effects of the corporate tax through capital) and other relevant company 
characteristics, we examine whether firms with a higher tax liability pay lower wages, 
ceteris paribus. Analysing this variation enables us to identify the direct effect of the 
tax on wages, while controlling for other effects through the pre-tax level of profit. It 
does not allow us to identify the scale of indirect effects. 
We are able to identify the effects of taxation by exploiting firm- and time-
specific variation in the tax liability. We therefore do not have to rely solely on changes 
in the statutory tax system. Tax liabilities can vary across firms with similar levels of 
profit because of diversity in the form of their economic activity, such as the assets 
invested in and the sources of finance used, the extent to which profits are shifted 
between subsidiaries, the extent of losses brought forward from earlier periods, and a 
number of other reasons. We use lagged values of firm-specific variables based on these 
factors as instruments for the endogenous tax liability. 
Using micro data also allows us to exploit the heterogeneity of companies’ 
behaviour, displaying more cross-sectional variation, which is useful for identifying 
parameters. We are able to exploit companies’ heterogeneity to analyse whether the 
incidence of the corporate income tax differs according to the type of firm. For example, 
multinational corporations may differ from domestic companies because they have the 
option to relocate part or all of their productive activity abroad. Moreover, firms in 
multinational groups are more likely to shift profit to lower tax jurisdictions. This may 
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increase their bargaining power, as well as reducing the location-specific profit over 
which they would be prepared to bargain. 
We provide rigorous empirical evidence that, in this bargaining framework, a 
substantial part of the corporation income tax is passed on to the labour force in the 
form of lower wages. Our central estimates show that, conditional on value added per 
employee, in the long run an exogenous $1 increase in the tax bill tends to reduce real 
wages at the median by 75 cents.6 Note that since wage payments are deductible from 
the tax base, this induced reduction in wages will generally generate a further increase 
in the tax bill. At the mean statutory tax rate (τ ), in our sample 35 per cent, this would 
imply a further increase in tax of just over 26 cents. Relative to this overall tax increase 
of $1.26, the effective incidence on labour is therefore approximately 59 per cent. 
Our bargaining model indicates that the effective incidence of an exogenous $1 
rise in pre-tax value added should be lower than this. The model is based on the 
assumption that the two parties bargain over the share of the post-tax quasi-rent. A rise 
in pre-tax value added is partly shared by the government in higher taxes. The model 
predicts that the effective incidence on labour of an exogenous $1 rise in pre-tax value 
added should be a fraction ( τ−1 ) of the effective incidence of an exogenous fall of $1 
in the tax liability. Evaluated at the mean tax rate of 35 per cent, the above result 
implies that wages would rise by 49 cents (0.75*0.65=0.49) in response to an 
exogenous $1 rise in pre-tax value added. In fact, our empirical results indicate that, at 
the median, the effective incidence of an exogenous $1 rise in pre-tax value added is 57 
cents. The similarity of these two estimates provides support for the hypothesis that 
firms and workers do indeed bargain over the post-tax quasi-rent. 
                                                 
6  Calculations are based on the estimated long run elasticity of -0.093 and are detailed in Section IV.D. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section II develops the conceptual 
framework, which allows us to consider the impact of corporate income taxes on the 
determination of wages, and to differentiate their direct and indirect effects. Section III 
presents the data used in the empirical section. Section IV discusses various 
econometric issues, and presents the results. Section V concludes. 
 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
We employ a simple model to inform the empirical work reported below. We consider 
the case of a single firm. The wage rate, w, and the labour force, N, are set through 
efficient bargaining between the firm and a single union representing all the workers in 
the company. Simultaneously, the firm chooses its capital, K. The model is similar to 
many used in the literature (see references in Booth, 1995; Blanchflower, Oswald, and 
Sanfey, 1996; Addison and Schnabel, 2003). 
 Employees have an outside wage available, w . This may reflect the wage rate in 
an alternative job, or an unemployment benefit; it is unaffected by the bargain. The 
union aims to maximise Nwuwu ))()(( − , where  represents the utility of a single 
worker and N is the number of workers employed by the firm. 
(.)u
The firm may have the option of shifting its activities to another location, or 
another activity where, net of the costs of shifting, it can earn an outside post-tax profit 
. The firm is prepared to bargain over location-specific profit (before wages), that is, 
the additional profit available by producing locally. Domestic post-tax profit is 
*π
TrKwNNKF −−−= ),(π .       (1) 
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),( NKF is a standard revenue function, depending on capital, labour, and the 
output price. We interpret F as value added. The cost of capital is rK. Corporation tax, 
levied at rateτ  is denoted T and is defined as 
{ }φατ +−−= rKwNNKFT ),( .      (2) 
Thus, the tax is levied on revenue net of wage payments and an allowance for 
the cost of capital, where α  is a measure of the generosity of depreciation allowances. 
In addition however, many other factors can affect the firm’s tax position. These include 
for example, the size of interest payments, the allocation across types of investment 
which receive different capital allowances, the existence of losses brought forward from 
an earlier period, the extent to which taxable profit can be shifted abroad to a lower-tax 
country through manipulating transfer prices, stock relief, or the contribution to an 
investment reserve or pension fund. We do not explicitly model these factors; rather we 
include them all in the term φ . The existence of this term implies that tax liabilities may 
vary across firms that have the same revenue, wage payments, and investment. In the 
empirical work, it is the existence of the factors incorporated in φ  which allows us to 
identify the effects of tax independently of . F
We assume that the additional factors determining the tax liability in the outside 
option are not captured exactly by φ . If they were, then this term would drop out of the 
wage bargain. This assumption is clearly reasonable if the outside option is to shift 
production abroad to where there is a different tax system. If the outside option is 
undertaken by the same domestic firm, then some elements of φ  (for example losses 
brought forward from earlier periods) could be common with the outside option. 
However, there are likely to be numerous other factors that will enable us to identify 
empirically the role of tax throughφ . 
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The bargaining power of the firm, μ, may depend on the cost of a temporary 
dispute with the workforce. The bargaining power of the union is (1-μ); this may 
depend on the availability of alternative income to the workers in the event of a dispute. 
We assume that wages and employment are determined by a Nash bargain, 
which maximises: 
[ ]{ } { μμ ππ *)()( )1( −−= −NwuwuB } .     (3) 
where π  is defined by (1) and (2). The first order conditions for maximisation are: 
0
*
)1(
)()(
)(')1( =⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−−−− ππ
τμμ N
wuwu
wu , and      (4) 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−−−=
)1(
*)1(),( τ
ππ
μ
μ
N
wNKFN .             (5) 
Finally, the firm chooses its capital stock by maximising its net of tax profit π . This 
yields the familiar expression: 
rmNKFK )1(),( +=         (6) 
where m is the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), )1/()1( τατ −−=m . The three 
expressions (4), (5), and (6) jointly determine the values of the wage rate, w, the capital 
stock, K, and the number of workers employed, N. 
To investigate the role of tax in affecting these three variables, we can begin by 
expanding  around the observed wage w. This yields )(wu ))((')()( wwwuwuwu −+≅ . 
Making this approximation and substituting into (4) generates an expression similar to 
(5), but with the marginal product  replaced by the outside wage NF w :
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⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−−−−
+−−+≅
NNN
rKmNKFww
)1(
*
)1(
)1(),()1( τ
π
τ
τφμμ .  (7) 
                                                 
7  Since it is based on equation (4), this specification could also be generated from a right to manage 
model. 
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Here the wage is approximately equal to a weighted average of the outside wage and a 
share of the per-employee location-specific profit, gross of wages. The deductibility of 
labour costs from taxable income implies that there are only three elements of the home 
country tax in the expression. 
The first is the effect of less than full deductibility of capital expenditure. For a 
cash flow tax 1=α , implying that 0=m . However, in the more common case of 1<α , 
the additional tax liability reduces the profit over which the firm is prepared to bargain, 
thereby reducing the wage rate. This effect is independent of any effect via the capital 
stock K, as discussed below. Note that α  typically varies across firms, depending on 
the mix of assets in which the firm invested. 
Second, the other factors determining the tax liability, captured in φ , also 
remain as elements affecting the size of the post-tax profit over which the firm is 
prepared to bargain. Conditional on other factors, a rise in φ  induces a rise in tax, and 
this will tend to reduce the wage rate: 
0
)1(
)1( <−
−−=∂
∂
τ
τμ
φ N
w .       (8) 
We describe this effect as the direct impact of taxation through the wage bargain: a rise 
in φ  reduces the wage conditional on the levels of capital, employment, and pre-tax 
profit. This is the effect identified in the empirical estimation when the wage rate is 
regressed on the tax liability per employee conditional on F/N, proxied by the variable 
value added per employee. The tax liability itself is likely to be endogenous, as we 
discuss below. 
There may also be an indirect effect of a change inφ  via a change in value 
added, F. This may be reflected in a change in investment, and hence in the capital 
stock, K. Nonetheless, the more obvious route for such an effect would be through the 
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effective marginal tax rate m discussed below. A change in φ  may also reflect a 
modification in the output price, conditional on a given level of capital and labour. The 
extent to which the company can pass on in its prices its tax liability incorporated in φ  
is constrained by competition in the output market. It is most probable that any change 
in a company’s tax liability that is not reflected in its competitors’ tax bill will not be 
passed on in higher prices. 
A third effect of taxation in equation (7) is that the home country tax rate also 
affects the value of the outside option in the bargain.8 The value of the firm’s outside 
option itself may be unaffected by the tax rate (depending on what the outside option 
is), but the deductibility of wages from the home country tax implies that in the bargain 
the outside option is effectively grossed up by (1-τ). This effect of the tax rate mirrors 
its effect through the firm’s discrete location choice. The latter can be affected by the 
tax rate, even under a cash flow tax (see Devereux and Griffith, 1998). 
There may be another indirect effect on wages through the impact of the 
effective marginal tax rate m on the cost of capital in equation (6). This is 
straightforward to analyse when labour is fixed. In this case, a rise in m induces a fall in 
K, from (6). In turn, the fall in K induces a reduction in the marginal productivity of 
labour , which in the absence of bargaining implies a reduction in the wage rate. NF
The analysis of a rise in m is more complex though when considering an 
individual firm, or indeed in any case where the labour force is not fixed. To explore the 
effect of m on the wage rate, we totally differentiate the three first order conditions, 
allowing w, K, and N to vary in response to a change in m, but holding all outside 
options constant. This yields: 
                                                 
8  Goerke (1996) presented a theoretical model identifying the effect of the home country tax rate. 
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and 
rdmdNFdKF KNKK =+ .       (11) 
Combining (9), (10), and (11) implies that a sufficient condition for a negative effect of 
m on w, 0<
dm
dw
 is that 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+<
KK
KKNNKNNK
N F
FFFF
NFw μ .      (12) 
Given concavity of the production function, the term in square brackets is positive. Thus 
a rise in m can reduce the wage rate, even when the wage exceeds the marginal product 
of capital. We describe the effect of m on w as another indirect effect of tax on the wage 
rate, since it allows for an effect through K and N, and hence through value added.9 This 
indirect effect determines the deadweight cost of the tax-induced distortions to capital 
and labour decisions. 
In the empirical work below, we attempt to identify only the direct effect of 
corporation tax on wages. We estimate a log-linear version of expression (7), where the 
post-tax quasi-rent per employee is captured by two terms: value added per employee 
and tax per employee. Identification of the direct effect of taxation is straightforward: 
conditional on the other factors, the ‘tax per employee’ term identifies the effect of φ  
on the wage rate. Because of the potential endogeneity of the tax liability, we instrument 
this term using two sets of instruments. One measures the legal parameters of the tax 
                                                 
9  Note though that part of the effect is direct, since even conditional on K and N, a rise in m reduces the 
post-tax location-specific profit that is bargained over. 
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system, and so is common to all companies in the same country and year. The other 
depends on the firm-specific tax liability. These measures include the use of debt 
finance, the makeup of capital expenditure, and the extent to which losses from previous 
periods may be used to reduce current liabilities. 
Note that the size of the tax effect is predicted to be larger than that of value 
added. Interpreting the tax term in the empirical equation as NT /* τφ= , the expected 
coefficient would be )1/()1(*/ τμ −−−=∂∂ Tw
(/
. By contrast, the expected coefficient 
on the value added per employee term is )1()/ μ−=∂∂ NFw
)
. This difference arises 
because value added is pre-tax: a marginal addition to value added is shared between the 
firm, the workforce, and the government. By contrast, a reduction in tax is shared only 
by the firm and the workforce. This accounts for the fact that the marginal impact of tax 
is grossed up by 1( τ− . 
In the empirical estimation, we also consider heterogeneity across firms. In 
particular, we compare firms that are part of multinational groups with purely domestic 
companies. In the model there are two reasons why these may behave differently. First, 
the outside option of the multinational *π  may be higher, implying that the size of the 
profit over which the firm is prepared to bargain is lower. This is difficult to test; we 
cannot observe the outside option since the firm does not in practice choose it. In the 
empirical estimation, we therefore cannot include the outside option. This means that 
we may over-estimate the size of the profit over which the firm is willing to bargain, 
and that the degree of overestimation is higher for multinational firms. This may induce 
greater negative bias in the estimated coefficients for firms that are part of multinational 
groups. 
As a possible proxy for the outside option, we experiment by including the value 
added and the tax of the rest of the multinational group. As a proxy for the outside 
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option, these variables would tend to have a negative impact on the wage. However, as 
Budd, Konings, and Slaughter (2005) and Riedel (2008) argued, it is also possible that 
domestic workers bargain over the firm’s entire profit, rather than only on the part 
earned domestically. In this case, these group variables would have a positive impact on 
the domestic wage. 
A second element of heterogeneity between firms is that a multinational may 
also find it cheaper to transfer production to another plant temporarily while it is 
engaged in a dispute with a union. This would tend to increase the firm’s bargaining 
power μ , as it can be more patient in waiting to achieve a deal, compared with a firm 
which does not have this opportunity. We can examine this effect by testing whether the 
coefficients from the bargaining equation (which reflects bargaining strength) differ 
between these two groups of firms. 
Note that the model predicts that a higher bargaining power of the firm would 
result in the firm paying a smaller share of any additional profit to the workforce 
through higher wages. Given the symmetry in the model across all cash flows within the 
firm, this also implies that a firm with greater bargaining strength would respond to an 
increase in tax by passing on a smaller proportion of the increase to the workforce. 
From equation (7), we have: 
( ) 0
)1(
/ >−=∂
∂∂∂
N
w
τ
τ
μ
φ .       (13) 
That is, as the bargaining power of the firm increases, the coefficient on the tax per 
employee term should rise. That is, a multinational which has greater bargaining power 
should have a smaller coefficient in absolute terms. 
Finally, note that in the empirical work below we do not attempt to identify the 
indirect effect of taxes through the effective marginal tax rate and the capital stock, or 
through an effect of φ  on prices, conditional on capital and labour. To evaluate the 
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former would mean that we could not include other firm-level variables as controls in 
the equation, since all of them would be affected by the size of the capital stock. 
Another possible approach would be to identify separately the impact of the effective 
marginal tax rate on investment and the capital stock, and the impact of the capital stock 
on value added. These effects would need to be combined with the effects of value 
added on the wage rate that we do estimate. We leave evaluation of these effects for 
future research. 
 
III. DATA 
The empirical analysis is carried out using a commercially available firm-level 
worldwide data set called ORBIS, compiled by the Bureau van Dijk (2007). It consists 
of accounting data from the balance sheet and profit and loss account of companies all 
around the world from 1996 to 2005. In addition ORBIS contains information on the 
ownership structure of the firms in 2005, including the number of shareholders, their 
names, their country of residence and their percentage interest in the company, and the 
number of subsidiaries, their names, and the percentage participation of the parent 
company. 
Initially, we selected only the companies not defined as ‘micro’ in European 
Commission (2003).10 This sample was further restricted as follows. First, it was 
limited to companies for which unconsolidated data and ownership information were 
available; our interest is in the determination of wages at the level of an individual 
company, rather than at the level of a group of companies. Second, observations which 
showed clear errors and missing values were dropped, along with observations in the 
                                                 
10  Selecting non-micro companies involved selecting only companies with at least two subsequent years 
of recorded total assets greater than €2,000 and at least one employee. 
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first and one hundredth percentiles of the distribution for the main variables.11 Finally, 
the dynamic model specification and the method of estimation we used required 
companies with at least four continuous years of data. The final sample consists of 
55,082 companies located in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
                                                
We used ownership information from the original full set of data to identify 
companies in the same group in our sample. Companies were classified as: (i) belonging 
to a multinational group if they were connected to at least one other company in a 
different country by an ownership link of at least 50 per cent of the capital; (ii) 
belonging to a domestic group if the company was connected to other companies by an 
ownership link of at least 50 per cent but with none of those companies located in a 
different country; or (iii) as a stand-alone company if it did not have any ownership 
links with other companies. 
Table I illustrates the distribution of companies across the nine countries. It also 
shows the number of companies that are stand-alone (overall around 35 per cent), part 
of a domestic group (30 per cent), or part of a multinational group (35 per cent). Table 
II indicates the number of observations used in the estimation for each company. Over 
15,000 companies (over one quarter of the sample of companies used) have data for 
eight years; a similar number of companies have either six or seven observations. Table 
III shows the number of observations per year used in the regressions; each year is well 
represented. 
 
11  The main variables are wage rate, number of employees, fixed assets per employee, tax bill per 
employee, and value added per employee. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Based on the conceptual framework in Section II, and in particular on (7), we consider 
the following log-linearised dynamic specification for wage rate w: 
2 2
, , ,
1 0
it j i t j j i t j j i t j i t it
j j
w w v Tγ β δ α α− − − −
= =
⎡ ⎤= + + + + +⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ 'j i,t jλ Z ε+    (14) 
where i and t index companies and years respectively, w is log wage rate, ν is log value 
added per employee, T  is log tax bill per employee, iα is a company-specific fixed 
effect, tα  is a year effect, and itε  is the error term. The vector  contains other 
variables associated with wage bargaining such as the outside wage and union density. 
About 15 per cent of our sample observations contain either a negative or a zero value 
for the tax liability. We assume that the effect of the actual magnitude of the tax burden 
on the wage rate is only present when there are positive taxes, so we include T only 
when it is positive. To account for the observations with non-positive taxes, we include 
in 
Ζ
Z  a dummy variable indicating a non-positive tax liability. We allow for a general 
dynamic specification, which can also be derived from a static model with an AR(2) 
process for the disturbance. 
Several econometric issues need to be considered before a choice of an 
appropriate technique is made for the estimation of a dynamic equation of this form. 
Due to the presence of permanent company-specific unobserved heterogeneity (αi) 
which is correlated with the lagged dependent variables and endogenous regressors (ν , 
T and the outside wage), the pooled OLS and within-group (WG) estimators are 
inconsistent. It is well recognised in the literature that the most appropriate technique to 
use in this case is the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) applied to the first-
differenced equation that does not contain αi. The precise set of moment conditions that 
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should be used to generate the appropriate instruments depends on the assumptions 
about the correlation between the regressors and the composite error term uit = i itα ε+ .12 
Much of the recent literature has focused on finding appropriate instruments for the 
application of GMM. Arellano and Bond (1991) (AB) proposed the use of lagged levels 
of the variables as instruments for the endogenous differences in the first-differenced 
model [GMM-diff]. However, later research (for example, Blundell and Bond, 1998 
(BB)) has shown that when the series are highly persistent, the levels instruments are 
weak predictors of the differenced endogenous variables. Therefore, the AB estimator 
can have very poor finite sample properties in terms of bias and precision. BB proposed 
the use of additional moment conditions that correspond to the use of lagged differences 
of endogenous variables as instruments for the model in levels. This GMM estimator is 
known as system GMM [GMM-sys]. It combines moment conditions for the model in 
first differences with the moment conditions for the model in levels. BB and Blundell, 
Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) showed that the system GMM estimator had better finite 
sample properties than AB’s original differenced GMM estimator. They advocated the 
use of this technique when the series were highly persistent. However, this relied on 
certain stationarity conditions of the initial observation. Bunn and Windmeijer (2007) 
showed that when the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity αi is high relative to the 
variance of the idiosyncratic error εit, the performance of the system GMM deteriorates. 
In summary, whether one uses GMM-diff, or GMM-sys, or even some other method of 
estimation will depend on the statistical properties of the variables used in the model. 
Our choice of instruments for our GMM estimation has been based on this discussion. 
We shall return to the issue of appropriate instruments later when we discuss the results. 
                                                 
12  We accommodate the time effects using year dummies. 
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We have used two tests to investigate the validity of our chosen instruments. The 
first is the Sargan/Hansen test for over-identification (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982) 
which requires a non-rejection of the null hypothesis being tested. The second is a serial 
correlation test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) that tests for the presence of serial 
correlation in the first differenced errors εit. White noise errors εit would imply an 
MA(1) process for the Δ εit, thus rejecting the null of no first order serial correlation but 
not rejecting the null of second order serial correlation. We use xtabond2 (Roodman, 
2006) in StataCorp (2005) to estimate our models using the GMM technique. 
IV.A. Variables 
The wage rate is calculated as the annual average company wage (that is, costs of 
employees (435) divided by the total number of employees (425)).13 We also calculate 
an outside wage. We assume that a worker could move to take up a job in the worst paid 
company in the same broad industrial sector14, the same country, and the same year; we 
take this to be the outside wage in that sector, country, and year. We use the ORBIS 
measure of value added (439). 
The tax variable recorded in the profit and loss statement (430) is our measure of 
the tax liability of the firm in each period.15 As discussed above, this measure is 
company and time-specific, in that the tax liability depends on many factors specific to 
the firm’s performance in any particular period. We treat the tax liability as endogenous. 
We use two different sets of instruments. The first set includes the country and year-
specific measures of the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), the effective average tax 
                                                 
13. This is the only measure of wage available in the dataset. The variable codes in ORBIS are given in 
parenthesis in bold. 
14  The broad industrial sector is defined using the NACE Rev 1.1 core codes at the 2-digit level. 
15  This is an approximation, since firms may record a value for the tax liability which differs from their 
obligation to the tax authorities; however, there is no reason to believe that there should be a 
systematic bias in using this measure. 
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rate (EATR)16 and the statutory corporate tax rate. These measures are based on the 
legal tax system, and so are unlikely to be affected by the shocks to the individual firm’s 
profit and wages. The second set of instruments is a collection of lagged time-varying 
firm-specific variables. We use the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total fixed assets as 
an indicator of the likely value of depreciation allowances for tax purposes. Non-current 
liabilities as a proportion of total assets are employed as an indicator for the extent to 
which taxable income is likely to be reduced by interest payments.  We also use a 
binary indicator of whether profit before taxes in previous periods was negative, which 
may indicate that the company has brought forward taxable losses to set against current 
profit to reduce current tax liabilities. 
All monetary variables are deflated to 2000 prices using OECD country- and 
year-specific consumer price indexes, and converted to a common currency (US dollars) 
using the year 2000 OECD national average exchange rates.17 We also investigate the 
impact of union density (UD) using a country- and year-specific index from the OECD 
(2004).18 Table IV displays some basic descriptive statistics for the main variables and 
instruments. 
IV.B.  Basic Specification 
Table V presents results for our basic specification using different estimators. This 
specification includes only value-added per employee (ν) and the tax bill per employee 
(T). All specifications include time dummies and two lags of each variable. Since the 
preferred specification required two lags of each variable, we have estimated the same 
model using different methods to illustrate the effect of choice of technique on the 
estimated coefficients. Column (1) presents the results from a pooled OLS regression. 
                                                 
16  These are calculated according to the methodology proposed by Devereux and Griffith (2003), and 
are computed from a number of sources. 
17  OECD CPIs and exchange rates are taken from www.OECDStat.org 
18 For a review of the effect of union density on labour market performance, see OECD (2006). 
22 
There is no allowance for company-specific unobservables in this specification, 
although the standard errors are clustered to account for this. Columns (2) and (3) 
present results from the WG estimation (OLS on variables entered in mean deviations) 
and OLS on the first-differenced data respectively. These are two alternative ways of 
dealing with company-specific unobservables in the estimation. Generally, in the 
absence of endogenous regressors, the pooled OLS estimator of the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable is upward-biased, while the WG and the OLS on the first-
differenced estimators are downward-biased estimates (Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer, 
2000). The coefficient estimates on the lagged dependent variables are very different in 
the three model estimations and are consistent with these biases. Both the pooled OLS 
and the WG estimates of the coefficient on wit-1 are positive, though of very different 
magnitudes. The first-differenced OLS model estimate of this coefficient is negative. 
Surprisingly, all other coefficient estimates are very similar. 
GMM estimation results are provided in columns (4) to (8). The sets of 
instruments used in these specifications are different. As noted above, all sets of 
instruments include country- and time-specific measures of the effective marginal tax 
rate (EMTR), the effective average tax rate (EATR), and the statutory corporate tax rate. 
Also included are the following time-varying firm-specific variables in logs: tangible 
fixed assets as a proportion of total fixed assets, non-current liabilities as a proportion of 
total assets, and an indicator variable for non-positive profit before tax. Indicator 
variables to pick up zero values of the logged variables were also included in the set of 
instruments. Columns (4) and (5) are based on the AB GMM-diff estimation of the first-
differenced equation using levels of the endogenous variables as additional instruments. 
Columns (6) and (7) are based on the BB GMM-sys estimation, which uses levels (first-
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differences) of the endogenous variables as instruments for the first-differenced (levels) 
endogenous variables. 
One practical problem with both approaches is that the number of instruments 
can be numerous. Unlike in two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) where the estimation 
sample is restricted according to the choice of lag for the instrument, in standard 
applications of GMM-diff and GMM-sys, a separate instrument is included for each 
time period. To illustrate this problem, consider our application where T= 8. If we were 
to apply 2SLS to estimate (14) in first-differences, wit-3 can be used as an instrument for 
Δ wit-1 under standard assumptions. This would imply that the estimation sample would 
be t=4,..,8. However, every additional lag of our dependent variable that is included in 
the set of instruments would result in the loss of one extra time observation. In our 
sample where the number of companies is large, every loss of a time observation results 
in a loss of around 55,000 observations per period. In contrast, the standard GMM-diff 
and GMM-sys approaches include separate instruments for each time period. This 
results in a sparse instrument set but a larger estimation sample. Three practical 
problems can result from the use of a sparse instrument set (Roodman 2007).19 First, the 
instruments can be too weak to identify the relevant effects. Second, the precision of the 
weighting matrix that is used in the GMM estimation is affected. Third, the 
Sargan/Hansen test has low power. Given these problems, we also investigate the 
approach in a strand of the literature where the standard GMM-diff instruments are 
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19  Taking a simple example to illustrate this issue, consider an AR(1) specification in first-difference as 
follows: Δyit=γΔyit-1 + Δεit, and the model would be estimated using t=3,..T. The instrument matrix 
for the i the company in the case of AB-diff would be: . 
For example, the instruments for the observation yi3-yi2 would be yi2 and yi1. 
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combined through addition to create a smaller instrument set (Roodman 2006, 2007).20 
Columns (4) and (6) present results from the GMM estimation that used the full set of 
unrestricted instruments, while columns (5) and (7) present results from estimation that 
used the smaller restricted instrument set. 
However, in all cases, the Sargan/Hansen test for over-identification is rejected 
and the tests for first and second order serial correlations are rejected, implying a 
problem with the estimators.21 The table reports that the degrees of freedom for the 
over-identifying tests in the case of the restricted instrument matrix are much smaller. 
However, the tests still reject the null of instrument validity.22 
We next turn to our preferred estimates, which are provided in column (8) of 
Table V. These results refer to the GMM estimation of the first differenced equation 
using a set of first differenced instruments. Using a general notation, in the example of 
footnote 20, the instrument matrix for this GMM estimation is as follows: 
2 1
3 2 2 1
4 3 3 2 2 1
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We treat all lags from two upwards of all our variables as being predetermined. The 
columns of the above matrix refer to the different instruments used. 
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20  This is achieved in STATA using the ‘collapse’ option in estimation command xtabond2. Taking the 
example given in footnote 20, the new instrument matrix would be . 
21  In Table A.I of the Appendix, we have provided the results from OLS and WG estimations of simple 
univariate AR(1) and AR(2) models. The results are not suggestive of a near unit root in the two 
main variables w and v. Hence, the need for the estimation of the model using GMM-sys is not 
present. When we used the GMM-diff estimator, we were only able to find a reasonable specification 
which passed all the model diagnostics when we used lags 5 or more as instruments. This resulted in 
a drastic loss of observations and we therefore did not pursue this strategy. 
22  Bunn and Windmeijer (2007) showed that when the variance of the unobserved company-specific 
heterogeneity (αi)  relative to the variance of εit increases, the bias in the GMM-sys can become quite 
high compared to the GMM-diff estimator and they advocate the use of GMM-diff in this case. 
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Unlike the results in columns (4) to (7) of Table V, for the specification shown 
in column (8), the tests for over-identification and the tests for first and second order 
serial correlations are all satisfactory. The Sargan/Hansen test for over-identification is 
not rejected. The test for first order serial correlation is rejected, while the test for 
second order serial correlation is not. This is what we would expect if the errors in the 
levels equation were not serially correlated. 
Turning to the coefficient estimates, the estimated effects are broadly consistent 
with the theoretical model presented in Section II, even though we have added dynamics 
in the empirical specification. Both the first period and second period lagged wage rate 
terms have a significant effect on the current wage rate, after controlling for company-
specific unobservables and accounting for endogeneity of the regressors. There is some 
persistence but it is not very high; the coefficients are smaller than the GMM-diff and 
GMM-sys estimates but are larger than the WG estimates in column (2). The short-run 
elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the tax per employee is quite large compared 
to other columns; it is estimated to be -0.095 in column (8), about six times those 
reported in columns (1) to (3). The long-run elasticity is a little lower at -0.066. The 
short-run elasticity with respect to value added per employee is estimated to be 0.773, 
and the longer run is again slightly lower at 0.723. We explore below the implications 
of these results for the incidence of the tax. 
IV.C. Basic Specification with Bargaining Variables 
In Table VI, we use the same estimator as in column (8) of Table V, but add variables 
associated with union bargaining. The new variables include a measure of country- and 
year-specific aggregate union density, and a measure of the outside option available to 
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the workers.23 As a proxy for the latter, we use the minimum of the log wage per 
employee in that sector and country in a particular year. We also include a dummy for 
those companies that pay the minimum wage. 
For ease of exposition, column (8) of Table V is reproduced in column (1) of 
Table VI. We add the extra variables one at a time: column (2) includes the aggregate 
union density variable and column (3) includes additionally the outside-option 
variables. Since these variables do not vary by company, they are unlikely to have a 
very strong effect. This is what we find, although the variables have the correct sign. 
Including these additional controls has little impact on the other coefficients and 
standard errors. The diagnostic tests change a little: in particular the Sargan/Hansen 
statistic no longer rejects the null at 10%. The estimated short-run elasticity of T is now 
slightly higher; for example, in column (3) it is -0.120. The union density variable is 
correctly signed and is positive and significant at 5%. 
In summary, the basic specification results displayed in column (8) of Table V 
do not change much with the addition of variables associated with the bargaining 
strength. Below, we use column (3) of Table VI as our preferred model for further 
investigations. We next examine the behaviour of multinationals compared to domestic 
companies. 
IV.D. Evaluating the Direct Incidence 
As already noted, the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the tax liability per 
employee, T, is a little higher with the additional bargaining variables. In column (1) of 
Table VI, the short-run elasticity is estimated at -0.095 and the long-run elasticity at 
about -0.066. In column (3), the short-run elasticity is -0.120 and the long-run elasticity 
                                                 
23  Although union coverage would be a better measure of union strength, we were unable to obtain 
consistent data series for our sample of countries for the years we have used. Hence, we include 
union density as a proxy for the strength of the union in these countries. 
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is -0.093. Standard errors of both the short- and long-run estimates for column (3) are 
given in Table VII. 
Since the wage rate is calculated as total compensation per employee, these 
estimates are equivalent to the elasticity of total compensation with respect to the tax 
liability. To use these results to identify the direct incidence of tax, it is useful to 
calculate the impact of an exogenous $1 change in the tax liability on total 
compensation. Calculations are presented in Table VII. We calculate the incidence for 
each observation in the sample by multiplying the estimated elasticity by the ratio of the 
wage rate to tax per employee. Based on the column (3) estimates, at the median of the 
resulting distribution, a $1 increase in the tax liability leads to a 97 cents reduction in 
total compensation in the short run, and a 75 cents reduction in the long run. These are 
very large effects: the majority of any additional $1 of tax is passed on in lower wages, 
and this effect happens within one period. Note though that the reduction in wages 
results in a further increase in the tax liability because of the deductibility of wages 
from the tax base. At the mean tax rate in the sample, a reduction in wages of 75 cents 
would generate a rise in tax of around 26 cents ( 26.0)75.0(*35.0 −=−=Δwτ ). The 
change in wages is just under 60 per cent (0.75/1.26=0.59) of the overall change in tax 
of $1.26. 
Recall that these are estimates only of the direct effects of an increased tax 
liability. They do not include any indirect effect through prices or the capital stock, 
since we are controlling for pre-tax value added per employee. Note also that we would 
not expect over-shifting in the direct effect, which simply measures the distribution of a 
given location-specific profit between the firm and the workers. 
It is also interesting to compare the effects of taxation and value added. 
Following the same procedure as above, we find the effective incidence of a $1 change 
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in value added by multiplying the estimated elasticity by the ratio of the wage rate to 
value added per employee. Table VII indicates that the median of the resulting 
distribution in the short run is 0.67. A fall of $1 in value added reduces wage payments 
by 67 cents. The long-run reduction is 57 cents. These figures are close to the median 
share of labour compensation in value added in the sample, which is 0.67. 
From the theory above, we would expect the incidence of the tax to be higher 
than the incidence of a change in the pre-tax value added; the theory would suggest that 
the impact of an exogenous $1 increase in value added would need to be grossed up by 
a factor τ−1  to find the expected impact of an exogenous $1 reduction in tax. Our 
estimate of 75 cents in the long run is only slightly smaller than this, evaluated at the 
median. 
There are a number of estimates of the elasticity of the wage rate to value added 
per employee in the literature. These vary widely and depend on the specification and 
econometric techniques used. For example, estimates from Nickell and Wadhwani 
(1990), Abowd and Lemieux (1993), and Van Reenen (1996) vary between 0.2 and 0.4. 
One possible explanation of the higher elasticities found here is that we use 
unconsolidated accounting data, which link wage payments of each subsidiary within a 
group to the value added of that subsidiary.24 Other studies that use consolidated data 
may combine separate wage negotiations in different parts of the group; this may reduce 
the estimated elasticity. We test for the effects of other parts of the group below. In any 
case, as pointed out already, our estimates of the marginal effect of changes in value 
added seem plausible in that they are consistent with the average share of value added 
captured by the labour force. 
                                                 
24  Budd, Konings, and Slaughter (2005) employed the same data source as used here, and found much 
lower elasticities. We attribute this primarily to the fact that they use a level, rather than a log, 
specification. By contrast, Riedel (2008) also used the same data, but with a log specification found a 
similar range of estimates of the effect of value added to those presented here. 
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IV.E. Behaviour of Multinationals 
Finally, we consider two forms of heterogeneity across firms, both of which involve 
multinational companies. Both are based on the specification of Table VI column (3) 
(which is reproduced in column (1) of Table VIII for ease of reference). 
First, we investigate whether the estimated parameters differ according to 
whether a firm is part of a multinational group or not. The conceptual framework in 
Section II indicated that the stronger the bargaining power of a firm, the lower the 
proportion of profit before wages that would be passed on to the labour force, and 
symmetrically, the lower the proportion of any increase in tax that would be passed on 
to the labour force. To consider differences in bargaining power, we investigate two 
sub-samples of the data: in column (2), we consider only stand-alone firms and in 
columns (3) and (4), we consider only firms, which are part of multinational groups. 
The short-run elasticities of the wage rate with respect to tax per employee are 
very similar for the two groups of companies, whilst the long-run elasticity is bigger for 
international groups (-0.108 for multinationals versus -0.075 for stand-alones). The 
long-run incidence of an exogenous $1 rise in tax is very similar. At the median of the 
stand-alone sub-sample, compensation would fall by 73 cents. For companies that are 
part of multinational groups, the comparative figure is around 70 cents. For value added, 
the short-run elasticities for the two groups are very close. However, the long-run 
elasticity, and the long-run incidence of an extra $1 of value added, evaluated at the 
median, are both slightly higher for companies that are part of multinational groups25. 
Both of these results are consistent with multinational companies having greater 
bargaining power, although the evidence is not strong. 
                                                 
25  The long-run elasticity is 0.816 for stand-alones and 0.900 for multinational companies. The long-run 
incidence of value added is 0.542 for stand-alones and 0.611 for multinationals. 
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A second effect for multinationals could occur through the outside option. In 
column (5) we investigate this for multinational companies by including the tax and 
value added variables for the rest of the multinational group. The group variables are 
calculated aggregating values over all of the other subsidiaries of the group for which 
we have data. We express these aggregates as a proportion of the number of the original 
company’s employees. If these terms proxy the outside option of the group, then a 
higher value added (or lower tax) in the rest of the group may indicate a more valuable 
outside option and hence a lower domestic wage. 
In fact, we do not find any significant effects of these variables. This may of 
course simply indicate that they are not good proxies for the firm’s outside options. 
Such lack of significance also differs from the results of Budd, Konings, and Slaughter 
(2005) and Riedel (2008). They find the opposite effect for the value added of the parent 
firm. The value added of the parent has a positive effect on the wage in the subsidiary. 
They attribute this to the domestic labour force bargaining over profits in the parent as 
well as in the subsidiary. However, neither paper includes the tax or value added of the 
rest of the multinational group, but only the parent. The lack of significance in our 
results may be due to this difference in our approach. More generally, it may reflect the 
possibility that the workers may bargain over worldwide profits, a factor that offsets the 
use of worldwide profit as a proxy for the outside option in the bargain. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The standard model of a small open economy yields strong results for the effective 
incidence of a tax on capital located in that country. Given a fixed world rate of return, a 
tax will raise the pre-tax rate of return, but leave the post-tax rate of return unaffected. 
The rise in the pre-tax rate of return is achieved by an outflow of capital, which reduces 
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labour productivity and hence the compensation received by the immobile domestic 
labour force. There is therefore a presumption that the burden of the tax will be shifted 
away from the owners of capital to the labour force. 
In this paper, we investigate empirically part of this effect. Specifically, in our 
estimation we analyse the impact of a change in taxation conditional on value added. 
We interpret this in the context of a wage bargaining model: for a given pre-tax quasi-
rent, a higher tax reduces the post-tax quasi-rent available to be bargained over by the 
firm and the employees. This wage bargain introduces a direct channel by which 
taxation affects the wage rate, a channel which can be estimated conditional on the 
value added of the firm. We estimate the size of this direct effect using a large database 
of over 55,000 companies in nine countries over the period 1996 to 2003. 
We do not estimate the indirect effect of a change in tax, which affects the wage 
rate through changing the size of the pre-tax quasi-rent available to be bargained over. 
More specifically, although by controlling for value added (as an estimate of the pre-tax 
quasi-rent) we estimate the impact of changes in value added on the wage rate, we do 
not estimate the impact of the tax on the size of value added. By excluding this effect, 
our estimate of the direct effect can be interpreted as excluding the effects associated 
with the deadweight cost of the tax, and any changes in output price. 
The results strongly support the hypothesis of a direct effect of corporate income 
tax through wage bargaining. We find that source-based taxes on corporate income are 
largely passed on in the form of lower wages. At the median, our results suggest that 75 
per cent of an exogenous increase in tax is passed on in lower wages in the long run. 
These estimates are for the direct effect of the tax only, conditional on value added (and 
hence indirectly conditional on investment); they are additional to possible indirect 
effects through value added. 
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We also investigate whether the incidence of the corporate income tax on the 
wage rate differs between stand-alone companies and companies that are part of 
multinational groups. We find only weak evidence that the companies that are part of 
multinational groups shift a smaller proportion of any additional tax onto the workforce 
(or keep a larger proportion of any reduction in tax). This is consistent with such 
companies having greater bargaining power. We find no effect on the wage rate of the 
profit or tax liability elsewhere in the multinational group. 
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Table I 
Number and Type of Company, by Country 
Country  Number of companies 
Number of 
observatio
ns 
 Total 
Stand-
alone 
Part of domestic 
groups 
Part of 
multinationals  
Belgium 1,954 224 453 1,277 3,408 
Finland 1,023 91 467 465 2,833 
France 17,505 4,894 5,645 6,966 54,511 
Germany 168 24 19 125 319 
Italy 8,483 3,212 2,775 2,496 29,021 
The Netherlands 303 10 32 261 911 
Spain 13,704 6,873 3,906 2,925 42,367 
Sweden 2,713 99 1,053 1,561 5,964 
United Kingdom 9,229 3,972 1,985 3,272 27,415 
Total 55,082 19,399 16,335 19,348 166,749 
 
 
Table II 
Number of Observations per Company 
Number of companies Years available 
per firm Frequency Per cent 
4 12,261 22.3 
5 12,217 22.2 
6 7,667 13.9 
7 7,632 13.8 
8 15,305 27.8 
Total 55,082 100 
 
 
Table III 
Observations per Year 
Years Frequency Per cent 
1999 24,087 14.5 
2000 30,614 18.4 
2001 32,848 19.7 
2002 38,527 23.1 
2003 40,673 24.4 
Total 166,749 100 
 
 
Table IV 
Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables and Instruments (in levels) 
  
Wage 
rate 
Value 
added 
per 
employee 
Tax bill 
per 
employee 
Negative 
tax bill 
(dummy) 
Union 
density 
Outside 
wage 
rate 
Tangible 
fixed assets/ 
fixed assets 
Non current 
liabilities/ 
total assets 
Negative 
profit 
before tax 
(dummy) EMTR EATR 
Statutory 
tax rate 
Belgium Mean 52.6 215.56 13.22 0.14 55.37 17.57 0.68 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.30 0.40 
 Median 48.45 78.05 4.54 0 55.6 17.69 0.86 0.10 0 0.06 0.30 0.40 
  S.D. 17.11 1,300.09 56.03 0.35 0.25 7.97 0.35 0.17 0.36 0 0 0 
Finland Mean 41.97 110.42 14.34 0.14 74.71 7.57 0.65 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.24 0.29 
 Median 39.75 60.76 3.32 0 74.8 5.82 0.78 0.10 0 0.15 0.25 0.29 
 S.D. 13.41 233.6 52.58 0.35 0.6 6.01 0.33 0.20 0.39 0.01 0.01 0 
France Mean 42.94 81.58 7.16 0.18 8.22 2.48 0.65 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.30 0.37 
 Median 39.01 53.52 2.49 0 8.2 0.42 0.75 0.06 0 0.14 0.29 0.35 
  S.D. 17.15 359.98 46.71 0.39 0.09 3.49 1.75 0.16 0.40 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Germany Mean 57.51 137.17 14.92 0.08 23.42 13.41 0.69 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.32 0.39 
 Median 54.79 90.25 5.46 0 23.2 8.91 0.84 0.24 0 0.19 0.31 0.38 
  S.D. 18.73 168.19 33.33 0.27 0.99 12.14 0.33 0.20 0.41 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Italy  Mean 32.58 76.13 10 0.03 34.68 11.82 0.69 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.35 0.43 
 Median 31.59 56.15 4.68 0 34.8 11.7 0.80 0.09 0 0.18 0.33 0.41 
  S.D. 9.3 205.54 30.05 0.16 0.82 9.84 0.30 0.13 0.39 0.04 0.04 0.05 
The Netherlands Mean 53.95 209.43 64.1 0.23 22.82 14.56 0.81 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.28 0.35 
 Median 51.49 83.93 7.28 0 22.5 11.6 1.00 0.06 0 0.15 0.29 0.35 
  S.D. 16.6 817.05 521.39 0.42 0.76 8.79 0.31 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 
Spain Mean 31.77 78.02 9.44 0.18 16.19 1.25 0.70 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.29 0.35 
 Median 29.21 48.77 2.95 0 16.2 1.12 0.82 0.07 0 0.18 0.29 0.35 
  S.D. 13.66 225.86 38.56 0.38 0.08 1.47 0.31 0.33 0.37 0 0 0 
Sweden Mean 36.51 96.08 10 0.26 78.12 4.27 0.72 0.25 0.23 0.11 0.23 0.28 
 Median 34.34 54.18 3.07 0 78 3.14 0.90 0.18 0 0.11 0.23 0.28 
  S.D. 11.02 500.9 53.41 0.44 0.34 4.99 0.34 0.25 0.42 0 0 0 
United Kingdom Mean 35.92 77.26 6.4 0.18 29.43 1.62 0.91 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.26 0.30 
 Median 33.55 48.26 2.22 0 29.3 1.1 1.00 0.07 0 0.16 0.26 0.30 
  S.D. 15.36 347.05 28.83 0.38 0.23 2.24 0.23 0.19 0.36 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: all values are in thousands of US$ at 2000 prices. 
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Table V 
Wage Equation Model Estimates (standard errorsii) 
Dependent variable: log(wage rate) 
OLS – 
levels 
 
 
(1) 
Within 
Group (FE) 
 
 
(2) 
OLS – 
first 
difference 
 
(3) 
GMM–diff 
AB – full 
instrument 
matrix 
(4) 
GMM–diff AB 
– restricted 
instrument 
matrix 
(5) 
GMM–sys 
BB– full 
instrument 
matrix 
(6) 
GMM–sys 
BB– restricted 
instrument 
matrix 
(7) 
GMM – uses 
restricted first 
difference 
Instruments 
(8) 
Log(wage rate) t-1 0.665*** 0.044*** -0.302*** 0.146*** 0.236*** 0.419*** 0.449*** 0.121*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.022) 
t-2 0.200*** -0.020*** -0.111*** 0.052*** 0.076*** 0.157*** 0.152*** 0.029*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) 
Log (tax per employee) -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014 0.011 -0.169*** -0.191*** -0.095*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.012) (0.034) 
t-1 0.005*** -0.001* -0.005*** -0.002 -0.008 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) 
t-2 0.000 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.003* 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy: neg or zero tax bill 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.249*** 0.313*** 0.190*** 0.121** 0.386*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.042) (0.069) (0.040) (0.050) (0.078) 
t-1 -0.032*** 0.007*** 0.021*** -0.063*** -0.071*** -0.121*** -0.110*** -0.096*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) 
t-2 -0.008*** 0.012*** 0.009*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.012** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Log (value added per employee) 0.265*** 0.281*** 0.264*** 0.756*** 0.621*** 1.121*** 1.082*** 0.773*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.025) (0.044) (0.013) (0.016) (0.069) 
t-1 -0.161*** 0.013*** 0.092*** -0.149*** -0.163*** -0.432*** -0.418*** -0.136*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) 
t-2 -0.049*** 0.023*** 0.041*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.131*** -0.122*** -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Hansen Test for over-identification 
 (Degrees of freedom) 
    
526.24 
(172) 
 
166.64 
(46) 
 
1191.31 
(227) 
 
653.68 
(56) 
 
45.64 
(37) 
[p-value]    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.156] 
AR(1) 
[p-value] 
-13.17 
[0.000] 
 -11.08 
[0.000] 
-22.40 
[0.000] 
-17.93 
[0.000] 
-29.94 
[0.000] 
-28.92 
[0.000] 
-13.99 
[0.000] 
AR(2) 
[p-value] 
-10.97 
[0.000] 
 -5.42 
[0.000] 
-3.21 
[0.001] 
-2.95 
[0.003] 
-3.14 
[0.002] 
-2.90 
[0.004] 
-1.23 
[0.219] 
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Notes: (i) Number of firms in the estimation sample is 55,082 and the total number of observations used is 166,749. (ii) All reported standard errors allow for clustering at the company level. (iii) 
Additional excluded instruments used in columns (4) to (8) were first differences of EMTR, EATR, statutory corporate tax rate, second and higher order lags of log (tangible fixed assets as a proportion 
of total fixed assets if positive), log (non-current liabilities as a proportion of total assets if positive) and binary indicators for: non-positive profits excluding taxes, zero tangible fixed assets and non-
current liabilities; (iv) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
Table VI 
Extensions to the Basic Specification (Column (8) from Table V) 
Dependent variable: log(wage rate) 
Basic 
specification 
 
 
(1) 
Basic 
specification 
& 
Union density 
(2) 
Basic specification 
& 
All bargaining 
variables 
(3) 
Log(wage rate)    
 t-1 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.135*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
 t-2 0.029*** 0.024** 0.031*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Log (tax per employee) -0.095*** -0.118*** -0.120*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) 
 t-1 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 t-2 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dummy: negative or zero tax bill 0.386*** 0.376*** 0.361*** 
 (0.078) (0.091) (0.088) 
 t-1 -0.096*** -0.094*** -0.089*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
 t-2 -0.012** -0.012** -0.011* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log (value added per employee) 0.773*** 0.849*** 0.889*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) 
 t-1 -0.136*** -0.145*** -0.155*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
 t-2 -0.022*** -0.023** -0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Union Density  0.012** 0.013** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
 t-1  -0.005 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
 t-2  -0.010 -0.005 
   (0.009) (0.008) 
Log(industry minimum wage)   0.002 
   (0.002) 
 t-1   0.003* 
   (0.002) 
 t-2   0.004*** 
    (0.001) 
Dummy: Company is min wage company   -0.731 
   (0.571) 
 t-1   0.124 
   (0.207) 
 t-2   0.037 
    (0.067) 
Over-identification test (Hansen) 
(Degrees of freedom) 
45.64 
(37) 
43.71 
(35) 
48.28 
(39) 
[p-value] [0.156] [0.148] [0.147] 
AR(1) -13.99 -13.19 -13.30 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
AR(2) -1.23 -1.12 -1.24 
[p-value] [0.219] [0.263] [0.214] 
Notes: (i) See notes to Table V. (ii) All regressions use difference GMM estimates. (iii) Excluded instruments 
used are the same as in the model of column (8) of Table V. 
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Table VII 
Estimated Incidence from Table VI, Column (3) Results 
 Elasticity Incidence 
Short run 
Tax bill -0.120 
(0.037) -0.970 
Value added 0.889 
(0.067) 0.670 
Long run 
Tax bill -0.093 
(0.031) -0.751 
Value added 0.851 
(0.067) 0.569 
 Note: (i) standard errors in parenthesis. (ii) The reported incidence is the median value. 
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Table VIII 
Difference GMM Estimates (standard error) 
Dependent Variable 
Log(wage rate) 
 
All companies 
(1) 
Stand-alone 
companies 
(2) 
Multinational 
companies 
(3) 
Multinational 
companies 
(4) 
Lagged log(wage rate) 0.135*** 0.079 0.166*** 0.093** 
 (0.024) (0.066) (0.028) (0.040) 
t-2 0.031*** -0.013 0.055*** 0.014 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.013) (0.016) 
Log (tax bill per employee) -0.120*** -0.118*** -0.117** -0.101*** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.047) (0.033) 
t-1 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.029** 0.028** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
t-2 0.007*** 0.006 0.004 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Dummy: -ve or zero tax bill 0.361*** 0.549*** 0.391*** 0.316 
 (0.088) (0.136) (0.142) (0.311) 
t-1 -0.089*** -0.149*** -0.045 0.185 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.034) (0.207) 
t-2 -0.011* -0.025*** 0.004 0.080 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.083) 
Log (value added per employee) 0.889*** 0.863*** 0.837*** 0.640*** 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.133) (0.105) 
t-1 -0.155*** -0.101** -0.122*** -0.111*** 
 (0.023) (0.045) (0.037) (0.051) 
t-2 -0.025*** -0.001 -0.014 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) 
Union density 0.013** -0.007 0.020** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
t-1 0.003 -0.012 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
t-2 -0.005 0.017* -0.017 -0.031** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) 
Log(industry minimum wage) 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
t-1 0.003* -0.000 0.005* -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
t-2 0.004*** -0.000 0.005*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy: Co. is min wage company -0.731 -1.091 -0.751 -0.037 
 (0.571) (1.222) (1.090) (0.759) 
t-1 0.124 -0.041 -0.213 -0.249 
 (0.207) (0.358) (0.523) (0.287) 
t-2 0.037 -0.033 -0.074 -0.091 
 (0.067) (0.137) (0.169) (0.100) 
Log (group tax bill per employee)    0.010 
    (0.018) 
t-1    -0.011 
    (0.010) 
t-2    -0.003 
    (0.003) 
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Table VIII 
(continued) 
Dependent Variable 
Log(wage rate) 
 
All companies 
(1) 
Stand-alone 
companies 
(2) 
Multinational 
companies 
(3) 
Multinational 
companies 
(4) 
     
Dummy: -ve or zero group tax bill    -0.062 
    (0.093) 
t-1    -0.014 
    (0.047) 
t-2    -0.006 
    (0.020) 
Log (group value added per 
employee)    0.074 
    (0.063) 
t-1    0.015 
    (0.049) 
t-2    0.003 
    (0.006) 
     
AR(1) -13.30 -9.61 -5.55 -5.13 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
AR(2) -1.24 -1.97 -1.11 -1.74 
[p-value] [0.214] [0.048] [0.265] [0.081] 
Overid. restrictions test (Hansen) 
 
48.28 23.37 23.24 40.00 
(Degrees of freedom) (39) (19) (19) (30) 
[p-value] [0.147] [0.221] [0.227] [0.105] 
     
Observations 166,749 62,955 56,883 35,820 
Number of companies 55,082 19,399 19,348 13,717 
Note: (i) See notes to Table VII; (ii) Additional excluded instruments used in columns (2) and (3) were first-
differences of EMTR, EATR, statutory corporate tax rate, third order lags of log (tangible fixed assets as a 
proportion of total fixed assets if positive), log (non-current liabilities as a proportion of total assets if positive) and 
binary indicators for: non-positive profits excluding taxes, zero tangible fixed assets and non-current liabilities; 
Additionally, third order lags of the group level variables of the additional instruments used in columns (2) and (3) 
were also used in column (4); (iii) The group variables are calculated by adding up the values for the subsidiaries 
present in the dataset, excluding the company concerned. The group tax bill and value added are divided by the 
employment of the subsidiary. 
Appendix 
 
Table IA 
Persistence of Wage Rate and Value Added per Worker. Simple Univariate AR Models. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Log(wage rate) 
 
Dependent variable: Log(value added per worker) 
 Pooled OLS Within-Group Pooled OLS 
Within-
Group Pooled OLS 
Within-
Group Pooled OLS 
Within-
Group 
Lagged log(wage rate) 0.863*** 0.080*** 0.682*** 0.080***     
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)     
2nd Lag log(wage rate)   0.206*** -0.011**     
   (0.005) (0.004)     
         
         
Log (Value added per employee)         
         
Lag. log (value added per employee)     0.844*** 0.014* 0.616*** 0.014* 
     (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
2nd Lag. log (value added per employee)       0.274*** -0.075*** 
       (0.005) (0.006) 
         
         
AR(1) test -23.11  -33.82  -26.55  -24.77  
[p-value] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
AR(2) test 5.79  -18.22  4.15  -30.83  
[p-value] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
Notes: (i) Time dummies are included in all of the above. (ii) The equations were estimated on the same sample as the one used in the main tables using 55,082 companies giving a total of 
166,749 observations; (iii) standard errors in parenthesis unless otherwise stated. (iv) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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